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1MAXIMIZING SECURITY BENEFITS FROM TECHNICAL COOPERATION
IN
MICROBIOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
by Graham S. Pearson
REPORT* OF THE NATO ADVANCED RESEARCH WORKSHOP
PIESTANY, SLOVAKIA:  18 - 20 MAY 2000
Introduction
1.  The NATO Advanced Research Workshop entitled "Maximizing the Security Benefits
from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology" was held in Piestany,
Slovakia on Thursday 18 through Saturday 20 May 2000 under the co-directorship of Dr
Cyril Klement, State Institute of Public Health, Slovakia, and Professor Graham Pearson,
Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies in the
University of Bradford, UK.    It was attended by 40 individuals, of which  28 came from 9
NATO countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland,
United Kingdom and United States) including representatives from the European
Commission (EC), the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology
(ICGEB) and one from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
11 from 4 Partner countries (Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine) and
one from Sweden.   Nine of the experts, from 8 countries, attending the Piestany workshop
are members of the delegations attending the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva.
2.  The workshop was designed to focus on how the benefits to security from international
cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology might be maximized under Article VII
"Scientific and Technological Exchange and International Cooperation" of the Protocol being
negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in Geneva to strengthen the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC).   The Workshop brought together a wider range of different
clusters of experts, many of whom met for the first time at the Workshop.   Indeed, the
Olympic symbol:
visually indicates the way in which the different clusters of experts -- in microbiology,
biotechnology, biosafety, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Protocol on the
Biological Weapons Convention -- came together very effectively to share their ideas and
experience on issues relating to the Workshop theme.  The presentations and discussion
really moved forward our collective appreciation as to how indeed security benefits could be
                                                
* This report is based on material that I presented in the final session of the Workshop giving my appreciation of
the outcome of the Workshop.   It represents my personal assessment of a highly effective and enjoyable
Workshop.
2maximised through technical collaboration in microbiology and biotechnology in a world that
is increasingly looking for safety, improved health and greater prosperity.
3.  The Piestany ARW was structured to enable discussion of the issues relating to
international cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology in such a way so that the
experience gained under ongoing technical collaboration could be analyzed so as to  address
how the benefits to security might be maximized  in the context of Article VII of the Protocol
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.   The workshop had five main sessions:
Session I.  Security Implications of Microbiology and Biotechnology.   The first
session set the scene for the workshop by outlining the background to the ongoing
negotiations of a Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention and showing how there was close relevance to international developments
in both biosafety and Good Manufacturing Practice. The potential dangers from
developments in microbiology and biotechnology was then examined and the way in
which the Pathogens Initiative programme had reduced these dangers in institutes in
Russia was addressed by presentations covering a Russian and a USA perspective.
Session II.  Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and
Biotechnology.   Overviews of ongoing international collaboration in microbiology
and biotechnology were provided by presentations by participants from Germany and
the ICGEB.   An overview was also provided of the European Commission research
programme on the "Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources" with
countries outside the EU.  Particular attention was given to biosafety with a
presentation on the ongoing Netherlands programme to implement biosafety
frameworks in the pre-accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe and a
presentation by a representative from the Russian Federation.  In addition, Good
Manufacturing Practice for licensed pharmaceutical and biological products was
examined with presentations by participants from Romania and the Russian
Federation.
Session III.  Implementation of Article X of the BTWC which promotes technical
cooperation between the States Parties.  The opening presentations in this session
addressed the importance of urgently strengthening the Convention given by a
participant from Hungary and the role that technical cooperation to aid the
development of States Parties could have within the Protocol in improving security
given by a participant from the UK.   These were then followed by a series of
presentations about international collaboration in the field of microbiology and
biotechnology between developed and developing countries in which the lessons
learnt from such collaboration were identified; these presentations were made by
participants from the UK, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Session IV.  Maximizing Security Benefits.    An overview presentation examined
how the security benefits under the BTWC Protocol might be maximized by technical
cooperation given by a participant from the Netherlands.  This was followed by
presentations on infrastructure, regulations and procedures by participants from the
UK, Slovakia and France, on databases, communications networks and clearing
houses by a participant from the USA, on the OPCW experience of international
cooperation and assistance by a participant from the OPCW and finally a presentation
on transfers of microbiological materials by a participant from the USA.
3Session V.  Maximizing BTWC Protocol Security Benefits from Technical
Cooperation.   The final session was a summary presentation by one of the co-
Directors of the Workshop in which a personal appreciation of the outcome of the
Workshop in regard to its theme of maximizing security benefits through international
collaboration in microbiology and biotechnology was presented.
4.  Overall, the Workshop was extremely timely as it enabled the participants who brought a
wide range of expertise in different areas to have an outstandingly informed discussion about
the contribution that scientific and technological exchange and international collaboration in
the context of Article VII of the future Protocol can make towards the strengthening of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The participation of representatives from the
ICGEB and the OPCW in the Workshop was especially valuable as it provided the
opportunity for all participants to gain a first hand insight into the work of these organizations
and the way in which their work is evolving.
5.  The workshop brought together experts engaged in a number of different areas:
• International technical cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology;
• Implementation of the biosafety aspects of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the UNEP International Guidelines on Biosafety, and the very recently
finalized Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
• Good Manufacturing Practice of pharmaceutical and biological products;
• Implementation of international cooperation and assistance under the OPCW; and,
• A Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
The key points emerging from the presentations and discussion in each of these areas is
considered in turn.
International Technical Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology
6.  The Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 saw the agreement of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development with a number of Principles and of Agenda 21
which addressed the pressing problems of today and also aims at preparing the world for the
challenges of the 21st century1.   Chapter 16 of Agenda 21 addresses "Environmentally sound
management of biotechnology" with five principal areas:
A Increasing the availability of food, feed and renewable resources
B Improving human health
C Enhancing protection of the environment
D Enhancing safety and developing international mechanisms for cooperation
E Establishing enabling mechanisms for the development and the environmentally 
sound application of biotechnology.
                                                
1Further details about Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity are provided in Graham S.
Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper
No. 6, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
4The objectives and activities outlined in Chapter 16 of Agenda 21 embrace a very wide range
of collaborative and cooperative activities in biotechnology.
7.  The requirements for technical cooperation in biotechnology in developing countries can
be summarised under the headings of technical and infrastructure:
Technical
• Acquisition of Technology
• Establishment of Critical Mass
• Access to Information
- Technical
- Commercial
• Development of Natural Resources
- In-Country
- Value-Added
• Biosafety Regime
• Patent Regime
Infrastructure
• Project Prioritization
• Project Management
• Industrial Infrastructure
• Globalization Issues
- Treaties and Convention (IPR, CBD)
• Political Will
• Public Acceptance
• Risk Assessment and Risk Management
Particular points to note were that:
- Developing countries are seeking cutting-edge technology.
- The biotechnology information required by developing countries is the same as that 
required by developed countries.
- Establishment of critical mass is key to success -- limiting factor is training.
-The training and the skills needed to enable proposals of a standard acceptable for 
funding to be prepared.
- Small targetted training grants are cost-effective.
- Project prioritization is of vital importance --
and has to be done by the developing country
     together with long-term commitment.
8.   The considerations that need to be addressed for successful biotechnology cooperation
are:
1.  Clear objectives and ground rules
2.  Capacity building
- Personnel, facilities and materials
3.  Availability of staff
54.  Communications
- In-country
- Internet
- Access to scientific information in  journals, books and libraries
5.  Continuity
6.  Conservation
- Biodiversity, degradation
- Value-added
7. Transparency
- Awareness of cultural differences
- Publicity and publications
8.  Realism
9.  It was noted that whilst there is a great deal of detailed microbiology and biotechnology
information now available on the internet, there are considerable difficulties in finding the
information and in evaluating the quality of the information.   Increasingly, new information
is being protected by copyright and by patents and there are difficulties in gaining access to
some of this information.  Some websites provide massive amounts of information but
without providing any guidance to the sites or any contacts from whom further information
can be obtained.  There was a clear need for an analytical element on internet based databases
which provided advice as to how to find reliable, quality information and essentially provided
"route maps" to other websites.
10.  The International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) with an
annual budget of $14 M is engaged on a number of capacity building activities in its Member
States and has a research programme with two main areas:
Human Health
• Infectious Diseases
• Vaccine Protection
• Genetic Diseases
Plant Biology
• Plant Transformation
• Stress Resistance
• Crop Improvement
In addition, ICGEB in its Advisory Services provides assistance in the formulation of national
bioscience policies, the definition of research goals, innovative patent policies and the
establishment of national biotechnology laboratories.  Two particularly important activities in
respect of international cooperation are:
• The ICGEB Biotechnology Information Sharing System (BISS) which provides a
comprehensive mechanism allowing a continuous flow of information on
1. Biosafety
2.  R & D activities in ICGEB Member States
3. Industrial Development
4. Quality Control, Harmonization and Implementation of GMP and GLP
6• The ICGEB Biosafety Unit which disseminates information through its biosafety
database2 and aids capacity building through
•  Annual biosafety workshops (since 1992)
• UNEP/GEF "Pilot Biosafety Enabling Activity Project"
• Cooperation and training with Member State biosafety authorities in 
biosafety and risk assessment.
There is clearly a potential role of the ICGEB in the implementation of the biosafety
initiatives under the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the future BTWC Protocol
although not all ICGEB Member States are States Parties to the BTWC.
11.  The European Commission has a significant research programme on the Quality of Life
and Management of Living Resources Programme3 (Fifth Framework Programme 1999 -
2002) which under Activity 2 "Confirming the International Role of Community Research"
has a budget of 475 M Euro divided into the following categories of cooperation with third
countries4:
1.  Pre-accession states   26
2.  NIS and other CEECs             112
3.  Mediterranean partners   55
4.  Developing countries 210
5.  Emerging economy countries and industrialised countries     5
6.  Training of researchers   15
7.  Coordination   52
Total 475
12.  In discussion of international cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology, the
question of whether aid should be conditional was raised.  It was noted that some countries,
such as the UK, claimed to have an ethical foreign policy.  This led to the idea that aid should
be conditional on those States having acceded to the international treaties that establish
international norms -- such as the BTWC or the Convention on Biological Diversity -- and
that if States have not acceded then aid should be provided to enable States to accede to these
treaties.
Biosafety
13.  The programme area "D Enhancing safety and developing international mechanisms for
cooperation" under Agenda 21 includes a number of specific activities which include:
                                                
2See for example, the ICGEB Biosafety Web Pages at http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/biosafety/bsfmain.htm
3Information on the Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources Programme is available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/quality-of-life.html
4Budget information is available at http://www.cordis.lu/fp5/src/budget5.htm
7Compile, update and develop compatible safety procedures into a framework of
internationally agreed principles as a basis for guidelines to be applied on safety in
biotechnology, including consideration of the need for and the feasibility of an
international agreement, and promote information exchange as a basis for further
development, drawing upon the work already undertaken by international and other
expert bodies.
It is this that has led to the development and agreement of the UNEP International Guidelines
on Biosafety and then to the negotiation completed in January 2000 of the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)5.
14.  An extensive programme of capacity building in biosafety is being carried out by the
Netherlands government under a three year $700,000 Matra Project "Implementation of
National Biosafety Frameworks in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe."   This
programme is directed at the pre-EC accession States of Central & Eastern Europe and has
four key elements:
• Regulatory Framework
•  Administrative System
•  Decision Making (Risk Assessment)
•  Information
National biosafety frameworks frequently address both pathogenic microorganisms and
genetically modified organisms and often include the establishment of a competent national
authority which will carry out inspections of national facilities.
15.  It was evident that the momentum for this programme comes from the governments of
the countries which wish to accede to the European Community and need to have the
necessary legislation, regulations and infrastructure in place.   It was clear that all States in
Europe and in Central & Eastern Europe were engaged in the setting up of the necessary
biosafety infrastructure which would result in:
• competent national authority and national inspections
• over time increased transparency and building of confidence
• contributions to international safety, health and security
as pathogens and GMOs know no boundaries
Whereas the driver for the Central & Eastern European countries is, among others, to join the
EU and thereby to comply with EU regulations, the driver for Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Asia could be the wish to rapidly implement the obligations of the Biosafety
protocol.
16.  It was also noted that for biosafety regulations to be credible, it was essential that these
focussed on the crucial requirements.
                                                
5Further details about UNEP International Guidelines on Biosafety and the international initiatives in biosafety
are provided in Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of
Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 6, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
8Good Manufacturing Practice
17.  Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) was another area that was being addressed by those
engaged in the production of licensed pharmaceutical and biological products in the pre-EC
accession States of Central and Eastern Europe who needed to reach standards acceptable by
EMEA (European Medicines Evaluation Agency).   This required the provision of a
documented audit trail and controlled processes as well as a national authority which set
standards and carried out inspections to ensure products were both reproducible and safe.
18.  It was recognized that for international trade in pharmaceuticals and biologicals, GMP to
international standards validated by international inspections needed to be adopted by the
production facilities concerned.  Increasingly, these international standards are being
harmonized notably between EMEA, FDA (Food & Drug Administration in the USA) and
Japan so as to increasingly provide a level playing field for international trade in products that
are internationally acceptable as being safe and reproducible6.
19.  There is a real opportunity for the developing world provided that GMP facilities to
validated international standards and full recognition of IPR (intellectual property rights) has
been achieved.   In particular, the low priced producer in a developing country is best placed
to make profits especially in manufacture of generic biotechnology drugs which are emerging
from their period of patent protection.   It was also noted that the consumer in the developing
world will not tolerate a second rate product for much longer.
20.  The risk to the Convention is minimal from those production facilities engaged in
licensed product manufacture that have GMP to these validated international standards.
21.  There is no comparable coordinated approach to introducing GMP to the EMEA standard
to the ongoing biosafety capacity building initiative in the pre-EC accession States in Central
& Eastern Europe.   Nor are there parallel drivers in other regions of the world such as
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, or Asia.
22.  Achievement of GMP to validated international standards depends on resources with the
skills and training to be able to write meaningful process documentation.   There appeared to
be a need for an international clearing house on validated GMP standards and the extent to
which these are increasingly being harmonized internationally.
23.  It was again noted that as in the case of biosafety, for GMP regulations to be credible, it
was essential that these focussed on the crucial requirements.
International Cooperation and Assistance under the OPCW
24.  The Chemical Weapons Convention provides a balance between the rights and
obligations of States Parties through its provisions on Assistance, Protection and International
Cooperation for the economic and technological development of States Parties.  Currently the
International Cooperation and Assistance Division of the OPCW (Organization for the
                                                
6Information about Good Manufacturing Practice and international harmonization is provided in Graham S.
Pearson, Article X: Pharmaceutical Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies,
Briefing Paper No. 8, July 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
9Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) has a strength of 15 and a budget of 5% of that of the
Organization ($60 M) ie about $3M.
25.  Article XI Economic and Technological Development of the CWC was a provision to
ensure universality of the Convention and the contents and scope of Article XI were broader
than in previous similar Conventions such as the BTWC of 1972 and the Environmental
Modification (ENMOD) Convention of 1977.   Article XI of the CWC is developed from the
ninth paragraph of the Preamble to the CWC which states that:
Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and
exchange of scientific and technical exchange in the field of chemical activities for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to enhance the economic and
technological development of all States Parties
26.  Examples of Article XI activities include:
• Providing administrative and technical support for National Authorities and other
implementation assistance,
• Supporting capacity building in Member States in areas relevant to the
implementation of the Convention,
• Facilitating exchanges of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical
information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not
prohibited under the Convention.
27.  Technical support for National Authorities has included training courses for personnel
of national authorities, a declaration support programme aimed at assisting National
Authorities to prepare their OPCW declarations and regional implementation workshops to
address implementation issues.
28.  Capacity building in Member States includes support for national laboratories relevant
for the Convention such as improving technical capabilities in analytical laboratories seeking
OPCW designation and an analytical symposium for laboratories considering participation in
OPCW proficiency testing.
29.  Exchange of chemicals, materials and scientific and technical information has
included conference attendance and internship support programmes providing support to
enable scientists and engineers from developing countries and from countries with economies
in transitions which are States Parties to attend international meetings in the fields of
chemistry and chemical technology or in other areas relevant to the implementation of the
Convention.  Under this programme more than 90 scientists over the past three years have
attended international conferences on subjects such as natural products chemistry, analytical
chemistry, destruction of toxic materials, risk assessment and management with respect to
toxic materials, environmental chemistry and toxicology, and treatment of intoxications and
topics related to the implementation of the Convention.
30.  Future plans are to refocus and consolidate the conference support activities in order to
ensure the maximum benefits so that in future instead of providing support to individuals, the
programme will support institutions or recognized scientific organizations in Member States
to organize conferences, seminars or other kinds of meetings on a relevant subject.
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31.  Internship programmes are aimed at helping scientists and engineers from developing
countries or countries with economies in transition to gain experience by working for a period
at an advanced research institute.  This will also help to establish links and joint research
programmes between research groups in developing and industrialized countries.
Scientific and Technological Exchanges and International Cooperation in the BTWC
Protocol
32.   It was noted that the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group negotiating the Protocol to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention specifically
includes the requirement that the Ad Hoc Group shall consider inter alia "Specific measures
designed to  ensure the effective and full implementation of Article X" of the Convention.
This Article places the following obligation on each State Party to the Convention:
1.   The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific
and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins for peaceful purposes.   Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall
also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or
international organisations to the further development  and application of scientific
discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for
other peaceful purposes.
2.   This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering
the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or
international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological)
activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention.
33.  Article VII of the Protocol, which is largely free of square brackets, has 8 sections and
occupies 13 pages (in contrast to the single page Article XI Economic and Technological
Development in the CWC).   Its sections include:
(A) General Provisions
(B) Measures to Promote Scientific and Technological Exchange
(C) Measures to Avoid Hampering the Economic and Technological Development of 
States Parties
(D) Institutional Mechanisms for International Cooperation and Protocol 
Implementation Assistance
(E) [Review of][Consideration of Concerns Related to] the Implementation of 
Article X of the Convention and this Article
(F) Cooperative relationships with Other International Organizations and Among 
States Parties
[(G) Safeguards
(H) Declarations
34.  Particular attention was drawn to Section (F) which lists a range of cooperative
relationships in order to, inter alia:
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(a) Derive the greatest possible synergy in, and benefits from:
(i) The collection and dissemination of information on the peaceful uses of 
biological agents and toxins
(ii) Sharing information on environmental release of genetically modified 
organisms;
(iii) Current Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), Good Laboratory
Practice (GLP), biological containment and other biosafety regulations
and practices;
(iv) Facilitation of access to databases containing information on the peaceful
uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, biosafety, and 
results of scientific research in the life sciences in areas of particular 
relevance to the Convention;
(v) The collection and dissemination of information on the diagnosis, 
surveillance, detection, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by
biological agents or toxins, in particular infectious diseases;
(vi) Regulations governing the handling, transportation, use and release of 
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins;
Several of these were discussed in various contributions to the Workshop.
35.  In setting the scene for this session it was noted that:
• The provisions already incorporated into Article VII of the Protocol cover a wide 
range of measures to promote scientific and technological exchange and 
technical cooperation for peaceful purposes.
• There is considerable potential for overlap with ongoing technical cooperation under
other auspices
• It will be important for the future Protocol Organization to focus on those 
cooperative activities for which it is best suited.
• Article VII measures will bring benefits to all States Parties and will over time 
increase transparency and build confidence.
• The Workshop could usefully identify areas, topics and capability gaps that the 
future Protocol Organization would appear to be well fitted to address.
36.  Attention was drawn to the statement made during the March Ad Hoc Group session by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands that:
We must endeavour to further the development by all states, great or small, east or
west, north or south, of the benefits that can be brought to them through peaceful uses
of biotechnology...But keeping in mind the downside of the developments in
biotechnology, we must also redouble our efforts to take measures to prevent the
spread of biotechnology for non-peaceful purposes.
Consequently in considering how to maximize the security benefits, it was equally important
to consider how to minimize the risks.
37.  Security benefits from international cooperation could come from:
• improving public health
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• improving food supplies (poverty alleviation)
• enhancing transparency
• building confidence
• assisting conversion activities
• providing implementation assistance
38.  Criteria which might be applied in the evaluation of suggestions for international
cooperation could include:
• Contribute to other aspects of protocol implementation
• Promotion of Protocol universality
• Synergies (avoiding unnecessary duplication)
• "Acceptability"
• Cost-effectiveness
39.  Particular benefits from the Workshop would come from the identification of concrete
suggestions for technical cooperation activities to be carried out under the future BTWC
Protocol Organization and from recommendations of how to raise the awareness amongst the
negotiators of the Protocol of what is already being done in other fora.
40.  Databases were already included in Protocol with language that Each States Party shall
promote and support ... the establishment, operation and updating of biological data bases
including those maintained by the Technical Secretariat on information relevant to the
purposes of the Convention as well as accessibility to such data bases.   This echoed the
words in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference which said that The
Conference considers that a world-wide data bank might be a suitable way of facilitating the
flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other scientific
developments.
41.  Data bases are essential for both biotechnology and for disease control.   These data bases
are almost always accessed from the web and it would consequently be logical that any data
base under the BTWC Protocol should likewise be accessed from the web.  It was also noted
that e-mail is now an essential communication and collaboration tool.   A particular concrete
example of benefits from technical cooperation would be through the future BTWC Protocol
Organization fostering and promoting internet connectivity both within and between States
Parties and the Organization.
42.  There is already a huge amount of relevant information on the web.  A problem is finding
the information and evaluating its reliability and quality.  There is a particular need for "road
maps/guide books" providing advice on how to find reliable data in quality web sites.   In
order to use the information available on the web, the following are necessary:
• Access
• Expertise and experience
• Infrastructure
43.  It was noted that the Convention on Biological Diversity in Article 18 includes the
requirement that "The Conference of the Parties at its first meeting, shall determine how to
establish a clearing house mechanism to promote and facilitate technical and scientific
cooperation."   This mechanism has been set up by the Convention on Biological Diversity
13
with the objective of the clearing house mechanism being to promote and facilitate technical
and scientific cooperation for the implementation ... of the Convention ... by:
• Human resource and institution development
• Facilitating technology transfer
• Joint ventures research programs
Furthermore, in the early stages of its implementation, the clearing house mechanism should
focus on:
• Exchanging and disseminating information
• Creating a directory of services
• Training for effective participation in the CHM (clearing house mechanism) and for 
technology transfer
• Promoting the establishment of partnerships
The advantages of the clearing house mechanism are the following:
• Facilitates access to information and advice
• Addresses bilateral as well as multilateral projects
• Is a bottom-up, needs-based mechanism
44.  There is much that can be learnt from the Convention on Biological Diversity by the
future Protocol Organization about the setting up and operation of a clearing house
mechanism. A further concrete example of benefits from technical cooperation would be
through the future BTWC Protocol Organization establishing a clearing house mechanism
addressing information and projects of relevance to the BTWC and its Protocol.
45.   Insofar as the Protocol Organization is concerned, the need will be for its web site to
contain links to existing databases, preferably with guidance as to how to find information in
these existing databases, and for the Organization to establish its own data bases on subjects
which are not available or adequately available elsewhere.  One example, that can be
identified from the experience of the OPCW, is a data base providing information on national
legislations, regulations and administrative measures related to the BTWC Protocol;  such a
data base would be valuable in providing transparency to other States Parties enabling them
to review their own national measures and help States Parties implement the Protocol.
General Observations
46.  During the Workshop there was also discussion of a number of topics which fell outside
those addressed above or which gradually emerged from the discussion and debate.  These
included the following.
47.  BTWC Protocol.  The BTWC together with a strong Protocol both strengthen the
elimination of biological weapons from States Parties and reduce the risk of bioterrorism.
The greatest danger of bioterrorism was seen as coming from State sponsored terrorists -- the
Convention and the Protocol are counters to States deciding to retain biological weapons as
an option.  In addition, national implementation of the Convention and the Protocol
requirements for national penal legislation make it a criminal offence for any individual to
work on biological weapons -- and provides another counter to bioterrorism.
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48.   An effective Protocol needs to:
• Reinforce the standard of behaviour -- to underline the international norm
• Contain mechanisms to implement the general purpose criterion
• Have a structure of rules and procedures which are taken seriously by States Parties.
The negotiation of the Protocol was nearing completion.  There were now islands of brackets
in oceans of clean text.
49.  Transfers.  An international survey was being carried out into the procedures currently
applied to the transfer of microorganisms from one culture collection to another although it
was noted that virtually any microbiology laboratory had its own individual collection of
microorganisms and that scientists would frequently exchange microorganisms with other
scientists.   Nevertheless, the USA in its 'select agent' programme administered by CD
addressing the storage, handling and transfer within the USA of a list of dangerous pathogens
which were of concern in the context of bioterrorism and the American Type Culture
Collection (ACT) in its internal controls provided useful models which could with advantage
be extended regionally and internationally.  Furthermore, the recently agreed Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity would lead to
implementation of Advanced Informed Agreement for transborder transfers of GMOs
(genetically modified organisms).  It was evident that transfer controls do contribute to safety,
health and security as pathogens and  know no boundaries.
50.  Public Awareness.  It was important that those working in microbiology and
biotechnology as well as the public are aware of the emerging Protocol regime.  One reason
for this was because of the importance of the general purpose criterion to the effective
implementation of the Convention and the Protocol.    It is those working at the cutting edge
of microbiology and biotechnology who need to be aware of the comprehensive prohibition
and to be able to alert National Authorities when appropriate.
51.  It was noted that a people's data base has been suggested which would contain a simple
brief description of international treaties and provide links to specialist data bases.
Furthermore, it was apparent that comprehensive knowledge of the location and organization
of microbiological laboratories within countries together with national accreditation and
inspection authorities significantly increases transparency and builds confidence.
52.  The optimum time to raise the awareness of specialists and the public would be after the
Protocol had been opened for signature.  The emphasis now must be on the early completion
of the Protocol.
Maximizing BTWC Protocol Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation.
53.  In a final presentation the different elements which had been addressed during the
Workshop were brought together in an appreciation of how the BTWC Protocol security
benefits might be maximized through technical cooperation in microbiology and
biotechnology.
54.  It was recognised that activities in microbiology and biotechnology taking place within a
country with no transparency resulted in a situation:
15
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55.  The objective was therefore to obtain transparency.   The approaches to improved
international biosafety standards provided a means of improving transparency in every
aspect -- research, development, production and use -- of microbiology and biotechnology:
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56.  In a similar way, the move to internationally harmonized and inspected standards of
GMP also provided transparency although in  the more limited area of production:
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57.  In contrast, using the same simplistic imagery, individual international collaboration
projects bring limited benefits:
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58.  Taking such considerations into mind, it was suggested that a pragmatic approach could
usefully be adopted.   Consideration of the real world situation for the OPCW and that is
probable for the future Protocol Organization shows that:
International Cooperation and Assistance
Organization Total Staff Total Budget ICA Staff % of total ICA Budget % of total
OPCW ~ 500 ~ US $ 65 M 15 3 US $3 M 5
Protocol
Organization
~ 200 ~ US $ 30 M 20 10 US $3 M 10
Consequently, assuming a US $3M budget in the future BTWC Protocol Organization for
international cooperation and assistance, what are the priorities and what criteria might be
used in selecting cooperation projects.
59.   It was suggested that the criteria might be:
1.  Broad applicability to microbiological and biotechnological activities
2.  Direct improvement of transparency
3.  Are independent competent authorities involved?
4.  Are there independent national inspections?
5.  Does the project contribute to an overall framework which builds confidence and 
hence enhances security?
60.  It was important in considering international cooperation under the future Protocol to
remember that:
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1. The BTWC Protocol is not unique
2.  There are other highly relevant international instruments:
-- Convention on Biological Diversity, Biosafety Protocol
-- Good Manufacturing Practice
-- Regional Directives
3.  There are significant benefits from validated (inspected) regulations.
61.  The priorities for international cooperation under the future Protocol might be:
1.  Implement Protocol -- this is an essential prerequisite.
2.  Assist States Parties in assessing needs for national infrastructure
>> benefits for safety, health and prosperity
      which result in security
3.  Assess the needs in the round
biosafety, GMP, and BTWC Protocol
4.  Focus on training & maintaining skills
-- building capacity
-- recognising national benefits
-- public information programme
5.  Data bases and clearing house mechanism focussed on relevance to the BTWC and
its Protocol with links to reputable data on quality websites. 
Overall Conclusions
62.   The following overall conclusions emerged from the Piestany NATO workshop on
"Maximizing Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and
Biotechnology" held on 18 - 20 May 2000:
1.   There is already an immense amount of ongoing international collaboration in the
fields of microbiology, biotechnology and biosafety.  It was evident that those
engaged in such collaboration have a great deal to contribute to building safety,
health, prosperity and security around the world although many have individually little
awareness of the Biological Weapons Convention or its Protocol.   For an effective
and enduring strong Protocol regime it will be important to reach out to and engage
this community.   Such engagement will over time contribute directly to greater
understanding between developed and developing countries and the easing of tension
between these countries as global safety, health, prosperity and security increase.
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2.  It was evident that there are major initiatives to improve biosafety standards
around the world involving the building nationally in each country of the necessary
infrastructure for a competent national authority and inspectorate.    There is a very
well coordinated initiative to do this within the preaccession countries to the European
Community.  The Biosafety Protocol could provide a similar encouragement to
countries around the world in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia.
Improved biosafety standards also bring benefits regionally and internationally as
neither pathogens nor GMOs recognise boundaries.
3.  Likewise, the companies engaged around the world in production of
pharmaceutical and biological products are introducing GMP to internationally
validated and inspected standards so as to manufacture licensed products which can
be sold on the global market.  With the expiry of patents, there is a particular
opportunity for companies in the developing world who have lower production costs
to make bigger profits provided that their production is to internationally inspected
GMP standards.
4.  The establishment of national infrastructures with competent national authorities
and inspectorates in both the areas of biosafety and GMP directly contribute to the
improved transparency and the building of national public confidence in the countries
concerned which lead to international safety and security.
5.  These ongoing initiatives -- into biosafety standards and into Good Manufacturing
Practice requiring the establishment of competent national authorities and
inspectorates --  directly contribute to increased transparency and thus to building
safety, health, prosperity and security around the world.  These developments are
directly relevant to the Protocol regime to strengthen the BTWC as over time they
contribute directly to achieving greater understanding between developed and
developing countries and to the easing of tensions as global safety, health, prosperity
and security increase bringing benefits to all.
6.  As the future Protocol organization is expected to have an overall strength of some
200 staff and an annual budget of around US $30M (less than half the annual budget
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), it is unrealistic to
expect a budget in the Protocol organization for international cooperation of more
than a few million US $.  Consequently, the organization will need to evaluate the
various alternatives for international collaboration so as to focus on those for which
the Protocol organization is best fitted to do and which will benefit the States Parties
to the Protocol.
7.  The international collaboration priorities for the future Protocol organisation are:
i.  Implementation of the Protocol
ii.  Assist States Parties in assessing their national needs for infrastructure in
their country to promote safety, health and prosperity which will bring
security.
iii.  Assess these national needs in the round -- considering biosafety, GMP
and the BTWC Protocol.
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iv.  Focus on training and maintaining skills within States Parties so as to:
• build capacity and capability
• enable States Parties to obtain and recognise tangible national
benefits
• develop a public awareness programme to develop popular support
v.  Develop a web based electronic data-base and clearing house mechanism
with "route-map" links to other reputable quality websites to enable States
Parties to find good quality data.
